South East Europe: Secularism after Communism

When the Berlin wall fell it gave the signal for the end of an era of Communism  in Eastern Europe. It took only few years before the countries from the Communist block dismantled the one party systems and introduced political pluralism as a precondition to transition into democracies.

One of the obvious consequences of the fall of Communism was deemed to be the return of the people to their respective religious backgrounds. Disappointment with communist eschatology (i.e. communism becoming a conservative movement in late real socialism), the willingness of the middle members of the administration to maintain religious values and the social anxiety which followed the collapse of the old system led to the revitalization of religion (1). Initially this is exactly what seemed to be happening, and the churches, expected people to flock back into an active church life.

However, this did not happen. The churches found themselves in a minority and to have lost much of their political influence (2). Attempts at living in the past or inviting liberalization and modernization only produced divisions within the church on methodological grounds (3).

Moreover the end of the East-West conflict did not bring the end of atheism. Indeed, many former Marxists believe that atheism is the one thing which should survive from their former worldview and that it should form a bridge between the old and the new systems. This is because of the western scientific atheistic tradition which is derived from the Enlightenment.

“The end of the East-West conflict did not bring the end of atheism”

If this is so, then neither atheism nor secularisation are a consequence of Communism in Eastern Europe (4). What can be said is that Communism picked up the idea of atheism from the Enlightenment and developed it into something that can be called anti-theism. This was certainly the case with Albania, but the communist ideology of Former Yugoslavia, although more lenient, was also strongly antireligious.

This specific anti-theistic mannerism of Communism was driven by its ideological vision for the New Man. This vision, would be achieved through the annihilation of the old social structures and cultural establishments emphasising the role of the individual. For this purpose “[t]he human relations that make up the society's fabric - the family, religion, historical memory, language - become targets, as society is systematically and methodically atomized, and the individual's chosen relationships are supplanted by others chosen for him, and approved by the state. Man remains alone, face to face with the state Leviathan. Only by melting into the collective, by becoming a mere drop of the "mass," can a man save himself from his terrifying loneliness."(5)

The result however was totally opposite. “[A]ll all former European communist societies experienced, to various degrees, the destruction of societal trust and societal texture ...” and  “lack of trust both at interpersonal and societal levels is still very high in these societies even today. This in turn led to civic, economic and political collapse.”(6)

Communism directly and indirectly affected the churches in a major way. Its direct effect was the open and tacit deterrence of the population to practice their faith, and the interference with the administrative and hierarchical affairs of the churches. This lead to the indirect effect of the churches being passive or confined to a very limited scope of social influence. The inevitable negative selection for clergy resulted in lack of proper church leadership, and charismatic and inspirational thinkers.

Another reason for the rise of secularism is detected in the poor adaptation of the churches to the new situation. They did not come with a clear religious message based on biblical principles, did not address the issues of folk religion and rampant superstition and tolerated it for the sake of increased outward religiosity, and did not offer anything (except, maybe nationalism) to fill the void of ideology that Communism left. This opened the way for superstition to play the role of an unlikely ally to secularism.

“Besides Communism the reason for the rise of secularism is detected in the poor adaptation of the churches to the new situation”

Superstition in the region usually means the conscious or unconscious syncretism that combines elements of Christianity and Islam with the pre-Christian pagan religions. It is the smorgasbord of the religious market which fits well within secular pluralism and it’s non-judgemental policy which lacks the requirement for any form of personal commitment, prescription of a lifestyle and the dogmatic formulations foundational for the established religions.

This can be reduced to “practical atheism” where the belief in the absence of God is not ideological but practical. God is, but he is not here and now,,  a view which leads to the amoral mentality that something is good if makes one feel good.

Decreasing church attendance indicates that people are alienated from the traditional chuches in spite of their “surge in religiosity”, especially youth who are usually looking for short-term solutions to their problems and quests.  The general population may still claim religiosity, but the assessment is that the churches play smaller role than within five years from the fall of Communism. This is due to the dichotomy between the churches as cultural / identity institution and anticlericalism and non-religiousness.

The pressure to adapt to foreign and imposed  standards is felt even more intensely with the presence of numerous NGO’s, armed with resources and personnel, which aim to introduce values and ways of life that are considered wrong and offensive.

The secular ideology is seen as an attempt to impose its own value-matrix of life, and to oust any kind of religious tenets from the public sphere as a shaping force of society. Rather than a religious identity, the secularist agenda is to transform the person into a mere individual guided by pure pragmatism.

Kostake Milkov has finished his masters and doctorate in Patristic Theology at the University of Oxford. Kosta and his wife, Nada, currently run the Balkan Institute for Faith and Culture (BIFC). He is a visiting lecturer of theology at Evangelical Theological Seminary, Osijek, Croatia, a Senior Associate of RZIM Europe and an ordained minister in the Evangelical Church in Macedonia. Since 2011 he has participated in the Langham International postdoctoral research seminar. Kosta, Nada and their daughter Gabriela live in Skopje, Macedonia.

Endnotes

1. Marko Kersevan, “The Change of Religious Situation in the Eyes of the Non-Believers” in in Milos Tomka and Paul M. Zulehner eds., Religion During and After Communism (London, SCM Press, 2000),  74-81.

2. Poland is an exception.

3. Albert Franz, “A Rise in Atheism?” in Milos Tomka and Paul M. Zulehner eds., Religion During and After Communism (London, SCM Press, 2000), 36-43.

4. Miloslav Cardinal Vlk, “Social Upheaval and the Phenomenon of Atheism: Two Challenges” in in Milos Tomka and Paul M. Zulehner eds., Religion During and After Communism (London, SCM Press, 2000),44-51.

5. Heller, Mikhail, Machine et les rouages, English, Cogs in the Wheel: the Formation of Soviet Man, Mikhail Heller; translated by David Floyd, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988, pp 29, 30.

6. Rogobete. 2004. 279.